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Abstract
People frequently reason about causal relationships and vari-
ables that cannot be directly observed. This paper presents
results from an experiment in which participants used statistical
information to make judgments about the number and base rates
of hidden causes, as well as the forms of causal relationships
in which those causes participated. Our data allow us to evalu-
ate several models of hidden cause discovery, and reveal that
people have different expectations about the forms of causal
relationships than recent theories predict.
Keywords: causal inference; hidden causes; minimum descrip-
tion length; functional form
In order to reason fluently about cause and effect, humans
must frequently make inferences about causes that are hid-
den from direct observation. For example, we explain the
behaviors of agents by appealing to mental states, we infer the
presence of illnesses from symptoms, and we can diagnose
hidden faults in mechanical and electrical systems by seeing
how they fail. This ability is essential for explanation, predic-
tion, and planning, but exactly how we reason about hidden
causes, or even come to believe that hidden causes are present
in the first place, is not yet well understood.
What are the signs that a hidden cause might be present
in a causal system? One is unreliability: hidden factors are
likely to be at work when a relationship appears to be un-
reliable or stochastic, and there is no observable reason for
this behavior. Previous work has explored how and when
people posit hidden causes to explain unreliable relationships.
When children observe a failure-prone electromechanical de-
vice, they tend to infer that its failures are due to a hidden
controller (Schulz & Sommerville, 2006). People can also in-
fer common hidden causes when unreliable effects tend to be
correlated (Kushnir, Gopnik, Lucas, & Schulz, 2010; Carroll
& Cheng, 2009; Mayrhofer, Goodman, Waldmann, & Tenen-
baum, 2008), and can make inferences about the nature of
hidden causes from their interactions with background rates
of effects (Carroll & Cheng, 2010).
Despite these results, there are many open questions about
how humans use statistical information to discover hidden
causes. In particular, there are no comprehensive studies that
explore how people infer the form of the function that specifies
how observed and hidden causes combine to produce an effect.
Many theories assume that prospective causes combine ac-
cording to noisy-OR and noisy-AND-NOT functions, but we
introduce an experimental paradigm that reveals that people
naturally entertain a broader range of causal functions.
The next section introduces the simple problem of causal
discovery that we consider. The following section describes
three models that capture different theories about how peo-
ple might solve this problem, including a model that focuses
on noisy-OR and noisy-AND-NOT relationships. We then
present an experiment that allows us to compare the models
and reveals patterns of judgments that standard accounts of
causal reasoning do not anticipate.
A simple causal discovery problem
This paper will focus on inferences about a causal system that
has a single visible cause v and a single effect e. In addition
to the visible cause, there may be one or more hidden causes
hi that influence the effect. For simplicity, we assume that all
variables are binary. Suppose that the system is observed over
many trials – in each case the visible cause v takes value 0 or
1, and the effect e takes value 0 or 1. The resulting sequence of
observations can be summarized by a pair of statistics [p′, p] =
[P(e= 1|v= 0),P(e= 1|v= 1)] that indicates the probability
that e= 1 when v is either 0 or 1.
For our purposes, the space of all possible pairs [p′, p] can
be organized into a handful of qualitatively different classes.
Figure 1a shows representatives of the five classes that we con-
sider in this paper. The classes can be enumerated by taking
three criteria into account. First, probabilistic relationships
between v and e provide evidence of hidden causes, and we
therefore distinguish between extreme statistics that equal 0
or 1 and intermediate statistics that fall between 0 and 1. For
example, pairs [0,1] and [p,1] in Figure 1a are qualitatively
different because [0,1] has two extreme statistics and [p,1]
has only one extreme statistic. The second and third criteria
are based on non-generic relationships that may hold between
p and p′. The second criterion requires that we distinguish be-
tween pairs for which p= p′ and pairs for which the statistics
are not equal. The third criterion requires that we distinguish
between pairs for which p= 1− p′ and pairs that do not have
this property. For example, pairs [p, p] and [p1, p2] in Figure
1a can be distinguished using the second criterion, and pairs
[p,1− p] and [p1, p2] can be distinguished using the third crite-
rion. Applying the three criteria and collapsing across all other
differences between pairs produces a total of six equivalence
classes. The class not shown in Figure 1a includes the pairs
[1,1] and [0,0], and we dropped this class because the effect
variable is constant.
Although the relationship between v and e may appear to be
probabilistic, we assume that e is a deterministic function of
v and potentially one or more hidden variables. This assump-
tion of causal determinism is consistent with several previous
formal approaches (Pearl, 2000; Lucas & Kemp, 2012) and
with previous suggestions that people are causal determin-
ists (Schulz & Sommerville, 2006; Frosch & Johnson-Laird,
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Figure 1: Predictions of the three models of hidden cause
discovery. (a) Examples of the different classes of statistics
that are possible in a single-cause scenario. (b) Predictions
of the independent-influence and Boolean MDL models. (c)
Predictions of the relational MDL model. The P(h1) and P(h2)
values assume, without loss of generality, that p < (1− p)
in the [p,1− p] case, and p1 < p2 in the [p1, p2] case. (d)
Explanation of the box diagrams in (b) and (c). The horizontal
dimension of each box represents variable v, and additional
dimensions are shown when hidden variables h1 and h2 are
postulated. Black dots show settings of the variables that
produce the effect. For example, the box diagram shown
corresponds to a truth table for disjunction.
2011). Given this assumption, a complete causal explanation
of a system characterized by the pair [p′, p] must provide an-
swers to three questions. The first asks whether the system
includes any hidden variables, and if so how many. The second
asks about the base rates of any postulated hidden variables.
The third asks about the functional form of the system, and
must be answered by providing a function that allows e to be
predicted with certainty given the values of v and any hidden
variables.
Theories of causal discovery
We now describe three models that represent different perspec-
tives on how people might solve the problem just introduced.
All three propose that people tend to generate the simplest
explanation of the data, and introduce hidden causes as needed
so that the function that determines the value of effect e can be
expressed as simply as possible. The key difference between
the models is that they make different assumptions about the
forms that causal relationships can take.
Independent influence model. A common foundation of
many accounts of causal reasoning is the assumption of causal
independence. This assumption requires that each cause influ-
ences the effect in a way that is independent of the value of
other causes. The independence requirement is typically satis-
fied by assuming that generative causes combine to produce
an effect according to a noisy-OR function, and that preven-
tive causes combine according to a noisy-AND-NOT function.
Our first model therefore assumes that the value of effect e is
determined by the formula
(c1 f ′1+ . . .+ cn f
′
n)(c
′
n+1+ fn+1) . . .(c
′
n+m+ fn+m) (1)
where c1 through cn are generative causes, cn+1 through cn+m
are preventive causes, and each cause ci is associated with
a failure variable fi that determines whether the mechanism
linking ci to e fails on a given trial. Negations are represented
using primes, and conjunctions and disjunctions are repre-
sented using products and sums respectively. For example,
c1 f ′1 is true if cause c1 is present AND the failure variable f1
is false. Similarly, c′n+1+ fn+1 is true if cause cn+1 is absent
OR fn+1 is true.
The independent influence model proposes that people ex-
plain the observed statistics in terms of the simplest function
that matches the schema in Equation 1. For example, if a
causal system is characterized by the pair [p,1], then the effect
sometimes occurs when v is absent, and an additional genera-
tive cause h with base rate p is inferred such that that e equals
v+h. In this case, the failure variables for v and h both have
base rates of zero, and we therefore allow them to be dropped.
If the pair for the system is [p1, p2], then there must be at least
two hidden variables, but these variables could combine in
different ways. For example, h1 could be a generative cause
and h2 could be the failure variable for v, which would yield
the formula h1+ vh
′
2. Alternatively, h1 could be a generative
cause and h2 could be a preventive cause, which would yield
(h1+v)h
′
2. Both explanations are viable according to the inde-
pendent influence model, because both formulas include three
variables and therefore have a complexity of 3.
Predictions of the independent influence model for five pairs
of statistics are shown in Figure 1b. The formulas that deter-
mine e are shown along with the base rates of any postulated
hidden variables. For each of the five cases only a single min-
imal explanation is shown. This minimal explanation is one
instance of a class of equivalent explanations: for example,
v+h in the third column can be replaced by v+h′ if the base
rate of h is set to 1− p rather than p.
Several previous researchers have pointed out that the as-
sumption of causal independence supports the discovery of
hidden causes, and our independent influence model is broadly
consistent with the work of Carroll and Cheng (2010) and
Mayrhofer et al. (2008). We have not attempted to character-
ize the process by which a minimal explanation is identified,
but one possibility is that people postulate hidden causes in-
crementally, introducing each one only when necessary to
explain effects that depend in a stochastic way on the variables
observed or postulated thus far.
Boolean MDL model. The independent influence model can
be viewed as a minimum description length (MDL) model be-
cause it infers the minimal instance of Equation 1 that accounts
for the available data. Our second model shares this emphasis
on minimal explanations, but works with a space of formulas
that includes all Boolean functions, not just the functions con-
sistent with Equation 1. For example, one explanation of the
pair [p,1− p] is the formula vh+ v′h′, where hidden cause h
has a base rate of 1− p. This formula is not permitted by the
independent influence model, which assumes that any cause
in the set {v,h1,h2, . . .} can only bind to a single variable in
Equation 1. The idea that arbitrary Boolean formulas may be
required to capture causal systems is consistent with some pre-
vious proposals (Yuille & Lu, 2008; Buchanan, Tenenbaum, &
Sobel, 2010), and is also closely related to Feldman’s work on
concept learning in a non-causal setting (Feldman, 2000). As
for the independent influence model, the Boolean MDL model
defines the complexity of a formula as the number of variable
tokens that it contains.
Predictions of the Boolean MDL model are shown in Figure
1b. Although the model allows a broader class of explanations
than the independent influence model, the two make identical
predictions for the cases shown in Figure 1. For example, even
though the Boolean MDL model can entertain the formula
vh+ v′h′ for the pair [p,1− p], this formula has complexity 4
and is therefore more complex than the formula h1+ vh2.
Relational MDL model. Our third model is similar to the
Boolean MDL model, but proposes that people draw from a
broader repertoire of representational primitives than is cap-
tured by Boolean logic. The relational MDL model extends the
Boolean MDL model by allowing formulas that capture equal-
ity and inequality relationships between causes. While these
relations tend to be absent from discussions of causal learning,
it seems plausible that people can make use of equality and
inequality relations when reasoning about causal systems.
Predictions of the relational MDL model are shown in Fig-
ure 1c. The model makes the same predictions as the previous
two models in all cases except one. The equality relation al-
lows the [p,1− p] pair to be explained using the formula h= v,
which indicates that e is present only if the value of h matches
the value of v. This formula has complexity 2, and is therefore
simpler than the simplest formula allowed by Boolean logic
alone.
In the next section, we describe an experiment that compares
the predictions of the three models against human judgments
about the five classes of pairs shown in Figure 1a. The ex-
periment has four possible outcomes. First, it may be that
human learners find it difficult or impossible to draw coher-
ent inferences when faced with such limited evidence and no
auxiliary evidence such as temporal information. In this case,
Figure 2: The interface used by participants to design their
own alien machines. Adjustable spinners are displayed under
an image of the alien machine. To the right of the machine is
an interactive table displaying all possible button settings for
this machine, and possible outcomes for each of these settings.
In the bottom right, clicking the “View long-run statistics”
button allows participants to view the long-run frequencies for
their machine under each setting of its visible button. In the
bottom left is a reminder of the long-run frequencies observed
in the original machine. The machine above corresponds to
the [0.5,0.8] instance of the [p1, p2] condition in Table 1, in
which a sound is produced in 80% of cases where the visible
button was set to yellow and 50% of cases where the visible
button was set to purple.
participants will offer relationships that are incapable of cap-
turing the observed statistics, or will make inferences about
the rates of hidden causes that are inconsistent with the rela-
tionships they posit. A second possibility is that participants
make judgments that are consistent with the predictions of
the independent influence and Boolean MDL models, which
would support recent proposals about hidden cause discov-
ery (Carroll & Cheng, 2010; Buchanan et al., 2010). A third
possibility is that the relational MDL model accurately pre-
dicts human inferences. The fourth and final possibility is
that people make coherent inferences about hidden causes that
are not consistent with any of these models, implying that the
representational machinery that supports causal inference (and
hidden cause discovery in particular) is more complex than is
often assumed.
Experiment
Our experiment used causal systems that were described as
alien machines, and one such machine is shown in the top
left region of Figure 2. Each machine had a single visible
button with two possible settings, yellow and purple. Each
machine also had a panel that could potentially conceal addi-
tional, hidden buttons. The panel for the machine in Figure
2 is open, revealing two hidden buttons. Each button had an
associated “spinner” that was used to determine the setting
of the button. These spinners were circular disks resembling
pie charts, which could be colored yellow and purple in any
proportions. Three examples are shown in Figure 2.
The aliens were said to use these machines by repeatedly
carrying out a sequence of actions known as a Spin-Set-Pull.
A single Spin-Set-Pull involves spinning all of the spinners,
setting the buttons accordingly, then pulling a lever (not shown
in Figure 2). Each Spin-Set-Pull either causes or does not
cause the machine to produce a sound.
Our experiment presented each participant with five condi-
tions corresponding to the families in Figure 1a. In each case,
participants observed the pair of statistics associated with a
given machine, but did not observe how many buttons (if any)
lay behind the panel and did not observe the spinners associ-
ated with any of the buttons. Observations for one condition
are shown in the bottom left of Figure 2 under the heading
“Observed Long-Run statistics.” On the basis of these observa-
tions, participants were asked to report the number of hidden
buttons, the base rates (i.e. the spinner proportions) for all
buttons, and the function that determined the effect (sound or
no sound) given the settings of the buttons.
Methods
Participants. Fifty-four Carnegie Mellon University under-
graduates participated in the experiment for course credit.
Materials and Procedure. Participants were provided with
a cover story that described the alien machines. To help partic-
ipants understand the scenario and their task, they were also
given a brief tutorial. Participants were first shown an example
machine and asked to perform a Spin-Set-Pull on this machine.
They then learned how to use an interface that allowed them to
design their own alien machines (see Figure 2). This interface
allowed participants to select the number of hidden buttons
their machine would have, with options ranging from 0 to 3
hidden buttons, and an additional option to specify a machine
with more than 3 hidden buttons.
When a participant selected between 0 and 2 hidden but-
tons, an open-panel machine with the corresponding number
of hidden buttons and spinners was displayed, along with a
table showing the outcomes tied to each of the possible but-
ton settings for that machine. For example, Figure 2 shows
a case in which a participant has specified a machine with 2
hidden buttons, and as a result a machine with 3 buttons and
3 spinners is displayed, alongside a table with one row for
each of this machine’s 8 possible button settings. Participants
could then interact with the table to specify whether or not the
Table 1: Instances of the 5 classes presented to participants.
Condition Instances
[0,1] [0.0,1.0], [1.0,0.0]
[p, p] [0.6,0.6], [0.4,0.4]
[p,1] [0.1,1.0], [1.0,0.1], [0.0,0.9], [0.9,0.0]
[p,1− p] [0.3,0.7], [0.7,0.3]
[p1, p2] [0.5,0.8], [0.8,0.5], [0.2,0.5], [0.5,0.2]
machine would produce a sound under each possible setting,
and could also adjust the proportions of yellow and purple
on each button’s spinner. After fully specifying a machine,
participants could click a “View long-run statistics” button to
view the long-run frequency with which their machine would
produce a sound, under each setting of the visible button. To
help participants understand the relationship between these
long-run frequencies and individual Spin-Set-Pulls, partici-
pants could also click a button to view single Spin-Set-Pulls
and their outcomes.
After learning to use the interface, participants worked
through 5 within-subjects conditions presented in random or-
der. Participants were told that each condition represented a
different alien machine, each with a closed panel and spinner
cabinet. In each condition, participants were told the long-run
frequencies with which an alien machine produced a sound
under each setting of the visible button. Using this informa-
tion, participants were asked to use the interface to show how
they thought the machine worked. Participants were told that
they could experiment with different designs for their machine,
but that the final state of the interface should reflect their best
guess about how the original machine worked. Each time a
participant clicked on the “View long-run statistics” button,
the interface recorded the participant’s current machine design.
Once participants were finished using the interface in a given
condition, they were asked to specify whether or not they be-
lieved that their machine produced long-run frequencies that
exactly matched those of the original machine, and also to
give a free-text response that characterized the button settings
that caused their machine to produce a sound. If a participant
specified a machine with 3 or more hidden buttons, the inter-
face did not display spinners or a table of outcomes, and the
participant was instead asked to respond only to these last two
questions.
The 5 conditions presented long-run frequencies that corre-
sponded to the 5 classes shown in Figure 1a. Several different
instances of each class were used, as shown in Table 1, and
the instances used for each participant were chosen randomly
from these options.
Results
Participants provided three kinds of information about each
alien machine: the number of hidden buttons they believed
to be present, the base rates for each button, and the function
that determined the value of the effect given the settings of
all buttons. Participants could interact with each machine
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Figure 3: Judgments about causal relationships. Column 1 rep-
resents the most common relationship classes. Backgrounds
mark the simplest classes according to the Boolean MDL and
relational models, as well as incorrect relationships that can-
not explain the observed statistics. See the Results section
for details on the classes and notation. When the simplest
relationship was not among the four most common guesses,
it was appended as a fifth row. The second column contains
the corresponding minimal Boolean formula. Columns 3 and
4 show proportions of initial (PI) and final judgments (PF)
judgments in each class, sorted by PF.
as many times as they wanted, opening the possibility that
their final judgments reflect the results of lengthy searches
that involve repeated guessing and checking. To address this
issue, we also report participants’ initial judgments: that is,
the judgments that they made about a given machine before
clicking the “View long-run statistics” button for the first time.
The patterns of initial and final judgments were very similar,
as shown in Figures 3 and 4.
There were a total of 54 participants who saw five condi-
tions each, but data were only available for 247 of the 270
possible (participant,condition) pairs due to server errors (2
pairs) and participants who inferred more than 2 hidden but-
tons or never used the “View long-run statistics” option when
specifying a machine (21 pairs). Figure 4 summarizes partici-
pants’ judgments about the numbers of hidden causes. Figure
4 shows that for every condition, the modal number of hidden
causes in participants’ final judgments corresponded to the
minimal number necessary to produce the observed statistics1.
Excluding [p, p], the minimum was chosen significantly more
often than half of the time (binomial tests, p< .05). For par-
ticipants’ initial judgments, the same pattern held in every
condition but [p, p]. Figure 4 therefore suggests that partic-
ipants were inclined to introduce hidden causes only when
required to by the observed statistics.
Figure 3 summarizes participants’ judgments about the func-
tional form of each system. The formula column in Figure
3 gives the shortest formula that describes the relationship,
under the Boolean MDL model. For the alien machines, x
and x′ denote different values of the variable x, i.e., purple
or yellow states for the three buttons. The formula notation
is described in the Theories section. In order to visualize
our data without losing the ability to address our main ques-
tions, we combined the distinct instances of each condition
and merged judgments into equivalence classes as follows.
First, we treated the hidden buttons as exchangeable, so that,
for instance, the relationship described by h2 + vh1 is in the
same class as that described by h1+ vh2. Second, we treated
the different values of the effect (sound or no sound) as being
equivalent, so that h+ v and (h+ v)′ are in the same class.
Third, we treated values of the causes as being equivalent, so
that h1+h′2 and h1+h2 are in the same class.
Figure 1 shows that all three models agree on the best expla-
nations for the [0,1], [p, p] and [p,1] conditions, and Figure 3
shows that the same explanations were the most common hu-
man responses for these conditions. The models make differ-
ent predictions for the [p,1− p] condition, and the data in Fig-
ure 3 are more consistent with the relational MDL model than
the other two models. Even though many accounts of causal
reasoning rely on noisy-OR/noisy-AND-NOT parameteriza-
tions, our participants seemed willing to invoke alternative
functional forms that are sensitive to whether two variables
take equal values.
1This minimum number was determined by assuming that each
hidden button’s state was determined independently, and finding the
minimum number for which it was possible to find base rates that
perfectly reproduced the observed effect rates.
010
20
30
40
50
Nu
m
. p
ar
tic
ipa
nt
s
[0, 1] [p,p] [p,1] [p, 1-p] [p1, p2]
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 1 2
Hidden causes
Nu
m
. p
ar
tic
ipa
nt
s
 
 
Initial judgments
Final judgments
0 1 2
Hidden causes
0 1 2
Hidden causes
0 1 2
Hidden causes
0 1 2
Hidden causes
0 1 2
Hidden causes
0 1 2
Hidden causes
0 1 2
Hidden causes
0 1 2
Hidden causes
0 1 2
Hidden causes
Non-minimalMinimal
[0, 1] [p,p] [p,1] [p, 1-p] [p1, p2]
Figure 4: Numbers of individuals who judged 0, 1, or 2 hidden
causes to be present, grouped by condition. The gray bars
correspond to the minimal number of hidden causes that are
necessary to explain the observed statistics.
Although the relational MDL model is broadly consistent
with the responses to the first four conditions, it does not pre-
dict the most common response to the [p1, p2] condition. All
three models predict that the standard noisy-OR parameteri-
zation h1 + vh2 should be the preferred explanation for this
condition. Figure 3 shows that this response was given by
some participants, but was dominated by vh1 + v′h2, which
specifies a function in which the visible button plays the role
of a switch: if v is purple then the value of e is determined en-
tirely by h1, and if v is yellow then the value of e is determined
entirely by h2. One reason why this “switch” explanation may
have been attractive is that the base rates for the two hidden
variables are identical to the long-run statistics p1 and p2 that
were provided as part of the description of the machine. In
contrast, the noisy-OR explanation means that some thought is
required to determine the base rate for one of the variables: in
Figure 1, for example, the base rate of h2 for the [p1, p2] con-
dition is a function of both p1 and p2. Additional work will be
necessary to determine whether this preference for the switch
explanation is an artifact of participants being asked to provide
numerical probabilities, or a more general phenomenon.
Judgments about functional forms and the rates of hidden
causes determine the long-run statistics for a hypothesized
machine. We can compare these hypothesized statistics to the
long-run statistics that participants actually observed to assess
their accuracy in explaining the behavior of the systems. For
both first and last judgments, their mean squared error rates
(M = .15, SD = .19 and M = .10, SD = .19, respectively)
were significantly lower than what would have been observed
if their judgments had not been sensitive to condition (p< .001
in both cases; permutation tests). Of the 54 participants, 5 had
initial judgment mean squared errors of less than .01. For final
judgments, 10 participants had mean square errors of less than
.01. These analyses provide additional evidence that many
participants were indeed able to make coherent inferences
about hidden causes on the basis of the limited information
provided.
Conclusion
Our results demonstrate that humans can not only infer the
presence of hidden causes from statistical evidence, but also
make coherent inferences about how hidden and observed
causes combine to produce an effect. Many theories of causal
learning assume that prospective causes influence an effect
independently, but our data suggest that people readily violate
this assumption in favor of explanations that invoke relation-
ships between prospective causes. Characterizing the full
range of basic elements that people use to construct causal
explanations is an important goal for future work.
Our analysis combined different kinds of causal relation-
ships into a small number of equivalence classes. This ap-
proach provided a simple way to evaluate the predictions of
different kinds of models, but our experimental paradigm can
also be applied to questions that demand finer distinctions be-
tween relationships. For example, pairs [0,0.9] and [0.1,1.0]
were both treated as instances of class [p,1], but the first pair
corresponds to a conjunction vh and the second pair corre-
sponds to a disjunction v+h. Whether people find conjunctive
relationships easier to discover than disjunctive relationships
is just one of many additional empirical questions that may
repay investigation.
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